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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. 
DONALD WAYNE GAMBREL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i Case No. 900559-CA 
Classification Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction following a jury trial 
on an Information charging the defendant with three (3) counts of 
Negligent Homicide. The defendant was sentenced to serve three 
(3) consecutive one-year terms in the Iron County Jail, one year 
to be served for each count of Negligent Homicide. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly sentence the defendant to 
three (3) consecutive one-year sentences? 
Pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
lower court's ruling shall not be set aside unless it is clearly 
erroneous. 
2. Did the trial court properly rule that the Iron County 
Attorney posted the requisite bond upon taking office or, 
alternatively, was acting as the de facto Iron County Attorney? 
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Pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
lower court's ruling shall not be set aside unless it is clearly 
erroneous. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
Utah Code Ann. §17-16-11 (1990): 
The Board of County Commissioners shall 
prescribe by ordinance the amount in which 
the following county and precinct officers 
shall execute official bonds before entering 
upon the discharge of the duties of their 
respective offices, viz.: county clerk, 
county auditor, sheriff, county attorney, 
county recorder, county assessor, county 
surveyor, justice court judge, and constable, 
and the Board may by ordinance require any 
deputy or assistant of any such officer to 
execute an official bond before entering upon 
the discharge of the duties of his office. 
Utah Code Ann. §52-2-1 (1990): 
Whenever any person duly elected or 
appointed to any office of the state or any 
of its political subdivisions, fails to 
qualify for any such office within sixty days 
after the date of beginning of the term of 
office for which he was elected or appointed, 
such office shall thereupon become vacant and 
shall be filled as provided by law. Whenever 
the bond of any officer of the state or of 
any of its political subdivisions is 
cancelled, revoked, annulled or otherwise 
becomes void or of no effect, without another 
proper bond being given so that continuance 
of bonded protection is afforded, the office 
of such officer shall thereupon become vacant 
and shall be filled as provided by law. Any 
elected or appointed official who has failed 
on the effective date of the act to qualify 
for the position to which he was elected or 
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appointed, shall be deemed to come within the 
provisions of this act, and the office of 
such officer shall become vacant at the end 
of forty days after the effective date of 
this act unless legal bond is given before 
the expiration of such period, and such 
office shall be filled as provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(1) (1990): 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of 
this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1990): 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement 
and includes speech. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990): 
With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that the failure to perceive constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-104 (1990): 
Conduct is an offense if a person engages 
in it with criminal negligence. Conduct is 
also an offense if a person engages in it 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. 
Conduct is an offense if a person engages in 
it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also 
if a person engages in it intentionally or 
knowingly. Conduct is an offense if a person 
engages in it knowingly, the conduct is an 
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offense also if a person engages in it 
intentionally. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1,3,9) (1990): 
A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall 
concurrently unless the court states in the 
sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
A court may impose consecutive sentences 
for offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
This section may not be construed to limit 
the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1990): 
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
Negligent homicide is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah hereby adopts defendant's general 
statement of the case with the following additional and relevant 
facts, to wit: 
FLATLANDER RIG 
Defendant Donald Wayne Gambrel was driving a 1987 Kenworth 
tractor diesel and pulling a 1988 Lufkin trailer (eighteen-wheel 
rig) with nine (9) gears and no jake brake, said configuration 
commonly referred to as a "flatlander rig" meaning that the 
tractor and trailer are primarily used in flat country and thus 
no need for additional gears or a jake brake. (T. 52-56) 
Moreover, the defendant's trailer was carrying seventy-eight 
thousand (78,000) pounds of steel ingots. (T. 58) 
DEFECTIVE BRAKES 
The defendant did not know how to adjust the brakes on his 
diesel tractor and trailer and he had not, in any manner, 
adjusted his brakes from the time he left Tennessee until the 
fatal crash in southern Utah. (T. 233-235) Utah Highway Patrol 
Trooper Kirk B. Harding, who testified at trial as an expert 
witness, stated that (a) he had been a Utah Highway Patrol 
trooper for twenty-one years, a truck driver for thirty years, 
and had investigated literally hundreds of accidents as a 
commercial vehicle safety officer (T. 116-119), (b) he was able 
to observe and test six (6) of the brakes from the tractor and 
trailer that were able to be tested after the accident and that 
none of the brakes tested met state or federal minimum 
requirements (T. 126), and (c) at the time of the accident, and 
under the conditions at the time of the accident, the defendant 
had no potential to stop. (T. 129) 
SPEED AND ROAD CONDITIONS 
On August 20, 1989, at 3:38 p.m., the head-on collision 
between the defendant's diesel and tractor and a passenger car 
occurred at mile post 13, Highway U-14, at the "S" curve (T. 45) 
on a very steep grade (T. 89) therein causing the death of Robert 
Griffin (age 37), Neoma Baldwin (age 30) , and Colette Griffin 
(age 16) (T. 47) who were traveling up Highway U-14, eastbound, 
in a gray and black 1983 Ford LTD 4-door vehicle. (T. 51) 
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The defendant admitted that, just prior to the head-on 
collision, he was traveling at approximately sixty (60) to sixty-
five (65) miles per hour. (T. 240) Neil Adams testified that he 
was traveling with his family toward Cedar City with a sick child 
and made several attempts, over U-14, to pass the defendant's 
vehicle but could not get around the defendant's diesel tractor 
and trailer. (T. 150-156) Mr. Adams further testified that the 
defendant's diesel tractor and trailer, on Webster's Flat and 
just before the downgrade and the accident, was traveling at 
speeds of eighty (80) to eighty-five (85) miles per hour. 
(T. 157) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The defendant was charged with three (3) counts of Negligent 
Homicide, convicted at jury trial on December 14, 1989, of all 
three (3) counts, was located in Memphis, Tennessee after having 
failed to appear for sentencing or cooperate with the Presentence 
Investigation Report and extradited back to the State of Utah 
where he was sentenced on October 3, 1990, to one (1) year in the 
Iron County Jail on each count, the sentences to run 
consecutively, one to follow the other. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court had the authority to sentence the defendant 
to one (1) year in the Iron County Jail on each count of 
Negligent Homicide, the sentences to run consecutively, one to 
follow the other. 
The trial court had jurisdiction to try this defendant as 
the Iron County Attorney did, in fact, post a bond upon taking 
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office and, alternatively, was serving as the de facto County 
Attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED PROPER AUTHORITY IN 
SENTENCING THE DEPENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES. 
Defendant appeals from the sentence imposed after his 
conviction of three (3) counts of Negligent Homicide as defined 
in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1990) and §76-2-103(4) (1990). 
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(1) (1990) 
and Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1,3,9) (1990), sentenced the 
defendant to one (1) year in the Iron County Jail for each count 
and ordered that the sentences run consecutively therein 
effectively sentencing the defendant to three (3) years in the 
Iron County Jail. Defendant-Appellant argues in his brief that 
consecutive sentences are not appropriate as the defendant's 
"act" was not a voluntary act but, rather, an "omission" and 
therefore the court's authority to impose consecutive sentences 
is precluded. 
In the case of State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. , 
1989), this court ruled that the intentional act of firing a 
firearm which harmed two (2) different victims could 
appropriately result in consecutive rather than concurrent 
sentences. The State would argue that the defendant's 
intentional acts of (a) driving a flatlander rig with 78,000 
pounds of steel over mountainous terrain, (b) without properly 
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adjusted brakes, and (c) traveling in excess of 80 miles per hour 
across the top of the mountain just prior to a steep downgrade 
and "S" turns would, in fact, involve an intentional act that 
would very foreseeably lead to the injury or death of multiple 
victims. 
As referenced in the defendant's brief, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated in State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981), that "a 
defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm 
more than one person or by means likely to cause harm to more 
than several persons is more culpable than a defendant that harms 
only one person." Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1990) defines 
"act" as a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-104 (1990) provides that conduct is an offense if 
a person engages in it with criminal negligence. The State would 
argue that this defendant clearly engaged in a criminal act and 
criminal conduct that resulted in the death of three (3) people 
and under statutory authority, as well as case law, the lower 
court had the authority to impose consecutive sentences for 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO 
SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT AS THE IRON COUNTY 
ATTORNEY POSTED THE REQUIRED BOND OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, WAS SERVING AS THE DE FACTO 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY. 
The Iron County Attorney, together with other elected county 
officials, is required to "execute an official bond before 
entering upon the discharge of the duties of their respective 
offices," Utah Code Ann. §17-16-11 (1990). Upon entering office 
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as Iron County Attorney, Scott M. Burns made certain that he had 
executed an official bond pursuant to the requirement of the 
above-stated statute by determining that Western Surety Company, 
by blanket policy, covered the bond of the Iron County Attorney* 
(R. 46-55) 
Defendant argues that the Iron County Attorney has not filed 
a bond, is not covered by insurance, and therefore cannot act as 
the duly elected Iron County Attorney, and thus the trial court 
was without jurisdiction to try this case. Upon hearing this 
argument in another case and relating to the Kane County 
Attorney, the Iron County Clerk obtained an opinion from Western 
Surety Company as to whether or not elected officials were 
covered in Iron County under the blanket policy, and specifically 
under a public employee's blanket bond, and the vice-president 
and corporal counsel of Western Surety Company assured the Iron 
County Clerk that all elected officials are covered under the 
bond. (R. 46-55) 
Assuming, arguendo, that the blanket bond did not meet 
statutory requirements, Plaintiff-Respondent argues that in the 
unpublished memorandum decision of George W. Elwood v. Tamara 
Holden, Warden, Utah State Prison, Case No. 890609-CA (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), this court cited Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 130 
(Utah 1983) for the proposition that "an officer de facto is one 
who claims and assumes official authority, is reputed to have it, 
and the community acquiesces accordingly." In the Elwood case, a 
deputy county attorney prosecuted a case having previously failed 
to file an oath of office as required and this court, citing 
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Vance, affirmed a denial of the petitioner's Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, holding that the deputy county attorney was acting as a 
de facto officer and thus there was no basis for reversal of the 
petitioner's convictions* 
In the case at bar, and arguably not as severe as an 
officer's failure to file an oath of office, the defendant 
"alleges" that the bond obtained by the Iron County Attorney was 
not an appropriate bond. While the State asserts that the bond 
was appropriate, there can be no doubt, even if the court finds 
that the bond was not appropriate, that Iron County Attorney 
Scott M. Burns was acting de facto. Specifically, there can be 
no argument that County Attorney Burns claimed and assumed to 
exercise official authority, was reputed to have it, and the 
community acquiesced in that authority. Finally, and in an 
overabundance of caution, and in the unlikely event a credible 
challenge was made that Scott M. Burns failed to file a proper 
bond and the office of Iron County Attorney was left vacant as 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §52-2-1 (1990) , the Board of Iron 
County Commissioners appointed Scott M. Burns as Iron County 
Attorney, nunc pro tunc, from and after January 5, 1987, and for 
the period to December 31, 1990, and bestowed upon said Scott M. 
Burns all powers, authorities, and obligations of the duly 
elected Iron County Attorney during said time periods and the 
Board of Iron County Commissioners specifically resolved that 
Scott M. Burns was the Iron County Attorney, de jure or de facto, 
from and after January 5, 1987, to the date of December 31, 1990 
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(the conclusion of the County Attorney's four- [4-] year term). 
(R. 46-55) 
The Plaintiff-Respondent takes the position, in agreement 
with the trial court's ruling of March 30, 1990 (R. 46-55), that 
the Elwood and Vance cases are dispositive of this issue before 
the court and an appropriate ruling would be that (a) the bond 
obtained by Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns was an 
appropriate bond but (b) even if the bond was not appropriate, 
Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns was acting de facto under the 
law and thus there is not a justifiable basis to find that the 
trial court did not have statutory authority to sentence the 
defendant to consecutive misdemeanor jail terms. 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah, Plaintiff-Respondent, respectively 
asserts that the trial court exercised proper authority in 
sentencing the defendant to consecutive terms in the Iron County 
Jail, and the trial court had jurisdiction to try this case as 
the Iron County Attorney was properly covered by a bond or, 
alternatively, was acting as a de facto officer. Based upon the 
foregoing, the State of Utah respectively requests that this 
court affirm the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment of the Fifth 
Circuit Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah. 
DATED this ($& day of February, 1991. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
for Respondent State of Utah 
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